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Austrian Galicia in the Hungarian Public Discourse of the Interwar Period

Abstract

The subject of my article is the image of former Austrian Galicia in Hungarian public discourse in the interwar period, with a focus on two dimensions: the standpoint of the political elite and that of the influential right-wing, revisionist mass-movement; its leaders and intellectuals. The Hungarians, like the Poles, Ukrainians, Ruthenes and Jews of Galicia, had been integral elements of multinational Austria-Hungary. Thus, the first part of the paper deals with the place, role, and character of Galicia in the Dual Monarchy, emphasizing its constitutional status and ethnic and cultural diversity. Because the image of Galicia in the interwar period in Hungary was strongly influenced by the persistent emphasis on the “danger of Galician Jews,” the paper analyses this in detail, stressing the arguments of the two main opinion-making groups mentioned above. In this context it includes the standpoint of the Hungarian Regent, Admiral Miklós Horthy. In addition, the picture of Galicia in Hungary of this time was closely connected to the traditionally strong and well-grounded Hungarian-Polish relationship, so it is necessary to review it, with a concentration on the period between 1938 and 1941. Finally, I give a short summary of aspects of the fate of Galician Jews who stayed in Hungary and who were deported to and massacred in Kamenets Podolsk. The main hypothesis of the paper is that although the image of Galicia in Hungary at the time was characterized by the negative propaganda slogan, the “danger of Galician Jews,” at least until 1941, this was overshadowed by the strong Hungarian wish to keep up and further strengthen the traditionally close Hungarian-Polish friendship. A historical precedent that contributed to this Hungarian-Polish friendship and sense of a common destiny was the role of Austrian-controlled Galicia within the Austro-Hungarian Empire, which, while it did not give the Poles living there the same freedom as the Hungarians within the empire, still contributed to the nation-building of the Galician Poles. Since the Trianon peace treaty gave

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Poland only a negligible amount of territory and population from historical Hungary (580 km² and 23662 people), the creation of an independent Polish state was a positive development in the eyes of the majority of Hungarians.²

Keywords: Austria-Hungary, Galicia, Galician Jews, Galician Poles, Horthy Era, Hungarian-Polish relations, Dual Monarchy

Galicia in the Dual Monarchy

Austria took Galicia (in 1772) out of “balance of power” considerations, to prevent Russia from reaching the Carpathians (Figure 1. map: Territorial changes of Galicia). The position between Poles and Ruthenes (Ukrainians) in Galicia was very similar to the German-Slovene relationship in the so-called “Hereditary Lands” (Austria). The Poles of West Galicia (with the city of Kraków at the centre) formed an ostensibly fully integrated nation (using the classical historical terminology) with a large class of nobles, great and small. It was, however, weaker than the Alpine Germans in that it had only a small native middle-class, trade and industry being mostly in the hands of Jews. The official classes had also been non-Polish since the partition. Its peasantry was brutalized and oppressed, but still regarded itself as a Staatsvolk, to use the popular German expression of the time. In East Galicia, the Poles had imposed their culture on the Ruthenes just as the Austrian Germans had on the Slovenes. The entire Ruthene aristocracy had become polonized, and cultural life at its higher levels was dominated by the Polish Roman Catholic Church. The national church of the Ruthenes, Greek Catholic, was poorly endowed and intellectually unpretentious, and except for its priests, the Ruthene people consisted almost entirely of peasants. In the entire district of Lemberg (later, Lviv), with a Christian population of half a million in 1772, there were only ten elementary schoolmasters, and the education level of eight of them had not gone beyond the ability to read and write Polish.³

The Imperial Government had decided in 1817 that it would be good policy to placate the Poles, lest they gravitate to Russian Poland. The severity of the regime in Galicia was consequently relaxed somewhat. The province was given the form of a Kingdom, with a viceroy and its own crown chancellery in Vienna. The estates were remodeled, the “Bench of Magnates” was reinforced through the creation of new titles, and it was allowed to meet again after a lapse of thirty-five years. The real authority, however, remained entirely with the Gubernium and its officials, who continued to be drawn, with few exceptions, from the Hereditary and Bohemian lands.⁴ According to the “February Patent” of 1861 the Imperial House of Deputies was composed of 343 delegates; 38 of these came from Galicia, more than 10%. Railway connection between Vienna and Galicia was established in 1865. Finally, in Galicia the population increase had

⁴ In the Habsburg Empire “Gubernium” was the term for the political administration of a province.
been particularly rapid. It had the largest population of any Austria-governed land, with over 6.5 million inhabitants by the 1890s.⁵

In Galicia, the Jews had lived in a spiritual ghetto. When they came to Vienna, their religion was all that they wished to keep distinctive: in social and political life; they attached themselves to an existing faction. In Galicia, when they assimilated at all, it was usually to the Poles. According to Alexander von Guttry’s book, the attainment of virtual autonomy by Galicia in 1863 “released the leading Poles from the political struggle which had almost absorbed them, diverting it into material channels.”⁶ It should be added that the non-political activities of the Poles were not solely material. During the second half of the nineteenth century in Kraków in particular, but also in Lemberg,⁷ centers of learning and the arts developed, giving birth to a range of cultural products; some were the work of native Galicians, while others of Poles from Russian and German Poland who found freedom in the Galician environment that had been lacking in their own localities.⁸

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⁷ The idea of Galicia was largely produced by the culture of two cities, Lemberg (Lviv) and Cracow. See more: L. Wolf, 2010. p. 486.
After the 1867 Austro-Hungarian Compromise, Galicia secured its autonomy (Figure 2. map: Galicia in Austria-Hungary). The “Compromise Era” inaugurated parliamentarism and constitutionalism in the Empire. Yet, in favoring the Hungarians, the Compromise left most people discontented. In particular, the Poles in Galicia and the Czechs in Bohemia had hoped their provinces would secure status on par with Hungary. Nevertheless, the Hungarian elite of the dualist period increasingly relied on the emerging Polish ruling classes in Galicia, as they were more afraid of the advance of the Czechs and saw the Poles as a counterweight. For the Galician Polish leaders, disappointment only grudgingly gave way to acceptance (with the significant exception of the radical nationalists). This adaptation was, in part, a product of the geopolitics of the Galician borderland. In 1863–64, Poles in Russia had risen up against their rulers. The Russian army violently suppressed the insurrection, and repression followed. Thus, it was the failure of radical solutions to their status that made an increasing number of Poles amenable to the terms of the Compromise. Just when the Russian Empire was imposing new limitations upon Polish political and cultural activities, its Austrian neighbor was opening new possibilities in these realms.
Thus, Galician conservatism was a product of a failed uprising in Russian Poland and the new politics in Austria. Conservatives who endorsed the Austro-Hungarian Empire hoped to use its institutions to promote Polish culture and politics. The conservative movement mobilized a wide spectrum of statesmen and intellectuals, many of whom lacked clear political allegiances. All, however, were united in their commitment to the Empire. They never entirely abandoned the goal of independence, but neither did they make it their most pressing political aim. The best example of that phenomenon was the career of Leon Biliński.⁹

During the years of World War I, the Western Allies did not care much about Central Europe. They were too preoccupied with their struggle against Germany. But the Allies officially spoke in favor of the future independence of Poland.¹⁰ This meant returning Galicia to Poland, but that was suppressed as mainly an anti-German maneuver. Ukrainians of Galicia first lost the war against the Poles and then were denied the autonomy promised to them by the Allies. By July 1919, the Polish army reconquered most of Galicia at the expense of the Ukrainians, although conflict over the region would persist through 1921. According to the Treaty of Riga in 1921, most of Western Ukraine (Galicia) remained in Poland (Figure 3. map: Galicia in Poland).

Public Discourse on Galicia in the Horthy Era

The Hungarians viewed Austria-Hungary in the following terms: married to the Habsburgs yet without love, they considered it a phase, a transitional stage in Hungarian national history. Particularly because of the trauma of Trianon, they saw dualism as an idyll, but they also remembered that the idyll had been full of reproach and animosities among various ethnic groups. Many Poles from Galicia shared this view, although 1918 brought them national liberation and was regarded as the most serene moment in their national history.¹¹ But they also considered the fall of Austria-Hungary to be a great shock, and many of them wondered where the double-headed Habsburg eagle had flown.¹² However, most of the native Galicians changed their attitude towards their motherland after the end of the Great War, as Joseph Roth noted in his work, The Bust of the Emperor (1935). A fictional Count Morstin¹³ returns home to Galicia after the First World War only to question the very meaning of home itself after the disappearance of Austria-Hungary: “Seeing that this village… now belongs to Poland and not Austria: can it still be said to be my home? What is home anyway? Are not the

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⁹ I. Vuskho, 2019. p. 64–89.
¹⁰ For this, see the 13th of the 14 points of U.S. President Woodrow Wilson.
¹¹ For the international aspects of the first years of independent Poland, see: K. Kania, 2021. p. 75–84.
¹³ The original figure behind this fictional person could be Ludwik Hieronim Morstin (1886–1966) a Polish soldier, diplomat, editor and poet likely of German origin. During the First World War he served in the Polish Legions and ended the war with the rank of major. As a result of his service, he received the title of Count from Franz Joseph in the summer of 1915.
Figure 3. Map: Galicia in Poland
particular uniforms of the customs men and the gendarmes that we were used to seeing in our childhood, are they not as much home as the pines and firs, the swamp and the meadow, the cloud and the stream.”

And there were the Central European Jews, who had special reasons to be afraid of the new settlement after the pogroms in Galicia during the Polish-Ukrainian conflict of 1919 and the anti-Semitic character of the “white terror” in Hungary after the collapse of the short-lived Communist regime. Galicia was the most backward region of the Austrian-Hungarian Empire with its impoverished Jewish population (10% of the total population of Galicia before 1914). In 1922, Austria took the initiative and proposed a general abolition of the obligatory passport and visa requirements for travel within and between the successor states, with the exception of immigration from “certain eastern states,” from where recurrent but unwanted immigration had been observed. This would essentially recreate the free travel zone of the Dual Monarchy with certain restrictions pertaining to the Jewish migrants from former Galicia.

The new political elites of the so-called successor states (especially in Poland, Hungary, and Romania) emphasized that their main goal was to create a “Christian nation-state” and that their Jewish population (or at least a large part of it) constituted “foreign parts of the body of the nation.” It is notable, however, that, especially in Hungary and Romania, the continuity of the elites before and after World War I was extensive. Their solution for the so-called Jewish question was the process of their pushing back from economic and cultural life and of finally transferring the “foreigners” out from their motherland.

But who were the “foreign Jews” in interwar Hungary? There was no exact definition for this phenomenon. According to public discourse, political speeches, and governmental decisions of the time, it seems that it meant those people who came from Galicia to Hungary during the Great War. This group was an expansion of those Jews whose ancestors had come from abroad (from eastern areas) in the nineteenth century. This was not officially permitted by the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the leadership of the Kingdom of Hungary, but it was tolerated because the predominantly Orthodox Jews who migrated from the northeastern province of Galicia to the Hungarian countryside in the form of internal migration contributed significantly to the boom in local, rural trade. On the other hand, and from a foreign policy point of view, it was a way of demonstrating that the internal conditions of the Austro-Hungarian Empire allowed the population a high degree of freedom of movement, in contrast to the Russian Empire, which was constantly organizing state pogroms against its Jewish population. (Figure 4. Satirical propaganda pamphlet: Jewish immigrants from Galicia) The figure of the caftan-clad Orthodox Jew, engaged in various shady dealings, was presented in mocking drawings, suggesting that he posed a significant threat to the Christian Hungarian population. The legend of “Galician immigration” became the key element of Hungarian anti-Semitism.

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According to this myth, the Jewish mass movement from Galicia in the nineteenth century was regarded as having stopped the positive assimilation process of the Hungarian Jewish citizens in the countryside and that these “Eastern masses” were ready to conquer Hungary. Hungarian elites believed that the Hungarian-Soviet regime of 1919 was a consequence of that process. Negative attitudes towards the Jews, who were accused of being the main cause of the revolutionary wave in Europe after the First World War, appeared with varying degrees of intensity in almost all countries.

The campaign against “Galician Jews” started in Hungarian public discourse at the end of the Great War (1918). This process was centered on various pamphlets, articles, and parliamentary speeches, but in the summer of 1918, even organized pogroms occurred to capture and deport “foreign Jews.” From the fall of 1919, there was a persistent theme requesting the deportation of “Galician Jews” in public discourse. Without claiming to be exhaustive, what follows are some examples of what was said in the Hungarian public discourse of the time:

1. Gyula Zákány, the vice-president of the greatest right-wing, revisionist mass organization of the period, Awakening Magyars (Ébredő Magyarak-ÉME), gave a speech on 30 November 1919 at the Budapest Redout (Vigadó) in which he urged the creation of “non-Jewish Hungary.” The ÉME was a mass organization with extensive social support, mainly due to its strong revisionist politics and its radically nationalist tone, which together had a profound influence on public opinion.

2. In an electoral speech of the Minister of Interior, István Friedrich (given on 16 January 1920) identified the Galician Jews with “dangerous germs” and emphasized that the new Hungarian National Assembly will immediately act to expel them. István Friedrich represented the intersection of the old and the new elite. In this respect, the new elite of the Horthy regime was even more opposed to the so-called occupation of the Jews than the elite of the Dualist period.
3. At the Hungarian parliamentary session of 16 September 1920, one of the intellectual leaders of the Horthy regime, the Roman Catholic bishop Ottokár Prohászka, expressed his strong wish to transport the Galician Jews to Palestine.\(^{16}\) The Roman Catholic Church in Hungary had not been free of anti-Semitic voices in the past, especially among the upper clergy, and the anti-Jewish sentiment conveyed by the Church was effective mainly in the countryside.

But there was also an aspect of the traditionally strong and historically deep-rooted Hungarian-Polish relationship that prevented the creation of a negative image of Galicia and its related Polish dimensions. Poland, a traditional friend of Hungary’s, was always sympathetic to it – according to the well-known historical myth, Hungarians and Polish had never been at war with each other\(^{17}\) – but since the conclusion of its French and Romanian alliances in 1921, Poland had ceased to give Hungary any active help. At the same time, Poland never forgot the Hungarian military and political aid given during the Polish-Soviet War, especially the food and military munition transports sent prior to the Battle of Warsaw in 1920.

After the Great Depression, the Hungarian prime minister, Gyula Gömbös, visited Warsaw on 19 October 1934, which was made possible by the German-Polish Non-Aggression Pact of January 1934. Gömbös wanted to achieve the Hungarian revisionist goals through a close German alliance. Gömbös offered Marshal Piłsudski a full-fledged alliance, which the Marshal rejected, saying that “his hands were tied by his existing alliances.” However, he promised to never go to war with Hungary and to do his best to restrain the Romanians. The Hungarian Regent Horthy’s visit to Poland took place in February 1938. It was treated as an event of first-class political importance and was much publicized in the press of both countries. In fact, however, it produced few concrete results. Horthy, by his own account, advised the leading Poles to yield to Germany’s wishes in Danzig and the Corridor, but the advice, although politely received, evidently had no effect.

In the spring of the next year (1939), although the sympathies of 95% of the Hungarian population were with the Polish side, a mixture of fear of offending Germany and a wish to see the principle of “peaceful revision” further asserted made the government advocate both privately and (by implication) publicly for Poland to yield to Germany’s demands. But Hungary’s role in the forthcoming German-Polish war was out of the question. According to the letter of Count Pál Teleki, the Hungarian premier, to Adolf Hitler (dated 22 July 1939), “in case of a German-Polish war, Hungary would, out of moral considerations, be unable ‘in so far as no serious changes occur in the existing circumstances’ to carry out an attack on Poland.”\(^{18}\)

Later, Hungary supported refugees who arrived from Poland.


\(^{17}\) This does not fully reflect reality, because in the period of the 10th-13th centuries, in the dynastic conflicts between the House of Árpád and the Polish rulers, Hungarians and Poles were sometimes opponents.

A turbulent period: World War II and Kamenets-Podolsk

During the war years, the campaign against the broadly defined Galicians in Hungary indicated that the Hungarian political elite made a stark difference between the “assimilated, good Jews” and the “bad outsiders,” who were (as they said) both responsible for the injustice of capitalist order and the rise of communism. This campaign against the “Galicians” and the request to expel “foreigners of Jewish race” was also strengthened by governmental circles. Between November 1919 and August 1931, various Hungarian governments issued six declarations pertaining to the expulsion of foreigners. But practically only 6000 “Jewish foreigners” were expelled up to the outbreak of World War II. The reason for this relatively low number goes back to the fact that very few had arrived from 1914 onward, and many had left Hungary during the Great War.

During the turbulent years of World War II, the Hungarian Regent, Miklós Horthy, repeated the argument of the public discourse on the Galician Jews, although he was rather far from the original anti-Semitic theory and practice of Nazi Germany. It is quite well known that Horthy’s role in shaping the fate of Hungarian Jewry is controversial, although there was no doubt that the Governor prevented the deportation of the Jews of Budapest in June 1944. Nor is there any reason to doubt that it was only at this time that Horthy learned that the majority of Hungarian Jews were not being sent to labour service but to extermination camps. However, Horthy’s attitude towards the Jews in the countryside at that time was highly controversial, and after the war he was severely reproached for this very reason. Indeed, Horthy distinguished between influential groups of Jews in Budapest belonging to the economic elite and upper classes and the poorer rural Jews, mostly of Galician origin.

This peculiar attitude was confirmed by László Baky, former State Secretary of the Ministry of Interior in the Sztójay government, in his prison testimony. Baky, as head of the State Security Police of the Ministry of Interior, played a decisive role in the ghettoization and deportation of Hungarian Jews, and he claimed that Horthy supported him in this.

Baky issued the decree of 7 April 1944, ordering the concentration of Jews in ghettos because, according to him, he had been encouraged to do so during an earlier audience by the Governor: “I have complete confidence in you, which is why I appointed you State Secretary of the Interior in these difficult times. Today, I need the greatest Hungarians […] I hate the Communist and Galician Jews, out of the country with them, out, out! But you see, Baky, that there are just as good Hungarians among the Jews here as you and I. For example, there are little Chorin and Vida. Aren’t they just good Hungarians? I just can’t let them be taken, too. The others, they can take them.” Baky’s assessment of Horthy’s

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19 In case of the Hungarian deportation of many of its Jews we may see an earlier parallel between this treatment and the Prussian treatment of Jews after the partitions of Poland. It expelled from its territory poor Jews while allowing wealthy ones to remain.

20 The Chorin and Vida families belonged to the very influential Jewish industrial, financial and business groups of the time.
attitude towards such a distinction was confirmed by Kurt Haller, the secretary of Edmund Veesenmayer, the special German envoy sent to solve the Hungarian Jewish question. According to Haller, Horthy regarded the assimilated Jews of Budapest as Hungarians, while the poorer rural Jews were merely rabble, for whom he did nothing for a long time. The same opinion can be found in an anonymous report on an interview with the Governor, which was given to Himmler in July 1943. Horthy is said to have expressed a willingness to get rid of “Jews originally from Galicia” but wanted to protect those who had “done much in science, industry and finance.” Although Horthy was not prosecuted either as a war criminal or for his attitude towards the Jews, it was unacceptable that, as a governor representing the citizens of his country, he distinguished between citizens according to where they lived, how much they owned or how “useful” they were. The perception of Horthy is still controversial among Hungarian historians and in Hungarian public discourse. Perhaps the only consensus is that, because of his controversial historical role, he can hardly have a place in the Hungarian historical pantheon.

The German attack against the Soviet Union, beginning on 22 June 1941, presented an unparalleled opportunity for the Hungarian Government to deport Jews from Hungary to Galicia during a six-week period in the summer of 1941. (Figure 5. newspaper clipping from Új Magyarság, 13.06.1941. Letter of World War I veteran soldier). The writer of the reader’s letter must have had concrete experience in the battlefields of Galicia in the First World War and represented a part of the Hungarian society (World War I veterans) who saw their problems, their misery, and the loss of historic Hungary as largely the work of the Jews.

The deportation of 22,000 Jews, most of whom were Polish citizens and refugees from Galicia, culminated in an unprecedented bloodbath in Kamenets-Podolsk

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at the end of August, at which point most of the deportees were slaughtered by the Germans. This massacre represented an important milestone in the course of the destruction, both as the first mass killing of this scale, and as the opening of a new stage in the planned destruction of the European Jewry.22

Conclusion

The interwar years brought enough poverty, disillusionment, and insecurity to Central Europeans that they looked back at the “good old days of peace” with some deserved nostalgia. In this sense, the multinational composition and the idea of a supranational political entity such as Austria-Hungary created a positive legacy and a unique Habsburg patriotism. Joseph Roth, an associate of Stefan Zweig, was a Jew brought up in German culture who left his native Polish-Ukrainian Galicia to make his career in Vienna because he considered Vienna a center of this culture. But the legacy of Austria in Galicia was more complicated and confusing, and many Hungarians shared the opinion of Konstanty Srokowski, a Polish journalist of Lviv: “And so it has been established, almost paradoxically, that the Austrian state that was mainly built upon the remnants of the Ottoman Empire […] has not managed to create the resources, neither the plan, nor any ideology suiting its eastern mission that would justify it at least in the eyes of its own population […] The Austrian state-idea has not been able to rise above promoting the most primitive dynastic interests, neither in this respect nor in many others. The stubborn emphasis of these interests caused the state to lose numerous opportunities to widen and strengthen itself.”23

Although anti-Semitism was omnipresent in Austria-Hungary, its emperor Franz Joseph was well known for his disgust for it, and Jews from the shtetls throughout the Monarchy (especially in Galicia), as well as the rich and educated, simply adored Franz Joseph as their legendary protector. The so-called Little Treaty of Versailles, regarding the protection of minorities, which the new states were forced to sign, was not satisfactory for Central European Jews who had reasonable doubt about whether this treaty, imposed by foreign diplomats, could really protect them from new demands and their Christian neighbors. But above all, Galicia was a symbol of Austro-Hungarian Empire’s multinationalism, in which Poles and Ukrainians each composed some 45% of the population, and the Jews made up the rest.

It has been shown that the establishment of territorial autonomy of Carpatho-Ukraine (Kárpátalja), created by Hungarian authorities between 1939 and 1944, was motivated by the historical autonomy of Galicia in the Dual Monarchy (1863/1867). But it needs to be pointed out that the new provisional or municipal constitutions of the Dual Monarchy aimed to realise national autonomy based on non-territorial arrangements. The Galician Compromise, which became law

22 In the last years there was a quite serious debate in Hungary on the role and responsibility of the Hungarian military and civil authorities in this deportation.
less than three weeks before the beginning of the World War I, also stipulated non-territorial elements for the provisional electoral system.24

While not essential, it was significant that the landed oligarchs of Austrian Galicia (Poles) and Hungary (mainly Hungarians) survived largely intact under the Sanacja regime in Poland (1926–1939) and Hungary’s counter revolutionary Horthy Era (1920–1944).

Broadly speaking, Hungarian public opinion and the elite of the time regarded the nation building movement of the Galician Poles as a positive phenomenon of the last period of the Dual Monarchy. Although they were ready to use the “danger of Galician Jews” for their propaganda purposes, their sympathy towards the Poles (including Polish Galicia) remained relatively consistent through the interwar years.

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24 In his lecture in 1936 a distinguished British historian-diplomat, Carlile Aylmer Macartney, gave a detailed analysis on the historical development of Ruthenia and Galicia. See more: Barta R. 2021. p. 122–139.
